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NATURAL RIGHTS AND POSITIVE LAW:
A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR McAFFEE's
PAPER
Philip A. Hamburger•
Were the rights retained by the people defined by positive law? 1
This is the issue explored by Professor McAffee and various other
scholars who dispute the history of the Ninth Amendment. 2 Surveying
the work of these other historians, Professor McAffee distinguishes
between those wh.o argue that the framers and ratifiers were "positivists" and those who attribute to the framers and ratifiers a socalled "natural-law" or "natural-rights" perspective-the latter being
the view that the rights retained by the people included rights not
delineated by the United States Constitution. McAffee rejects this
latter point of view in favor of the positivist interpretation of the
Ninth Amendment, and he thereby has done much to uphold the
traditional history of the Bill of Rights.
Although I agree with Professor McAffee's general conclusion
that the framers and ratifiers had a "positivist" understanding of
the Ninth Amendment, I must dissent from his arguments about
natural rights. Professor McAffee assumes that the framers and
ratifiers could not have taken both a positivist and a natural-rights
approach to the Ninth Amendment. On this basis, he defends a
positivist reading of the Ninth Amendment by arguing that the
framers and ratifiers did not understand the rights retained to include
• Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law; Visiting Professor, National Law
Center, George Washington University; B.A., 1979, Princeton University; J.D., 1982, Yale
Law School. This paper is based on my talk and therefore does not present detailed evidence.
Primary sources are used here only to supply illustrations. [Editor's note: Professor Hamburger's paper was presented at the Symposium in response to the version of Professor McAffee's
paper that was presented there. Professor Hamburger has not had an opportunity to see
Professor McAffee's subsequent revisions.)
1. For purposes of this paper, I am following Professor McAffee's non-Austinian usage
and am assuming that written constitutional limitations on government can be called "positive
law." Incidentally, eighteenth century Americans occasionally employed the phrase "positive
law" or "positive act" to describe the United States Constitution. More generally, if we are
to address the debate about whether the framers and ratifiers defined the rights retained in
terms of "positive law," some use of the label is unavoidable.
2. The historical literature is discussed in Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of
the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1215 (1990). For a selection of historical and other
commentaries, see THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
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natural rights. 3 In fact, however, the framers and ratifiers frequently
said that natural rights were among the rights retained. Moreover,
even when they were saying that their retained rights included natural
rights, they typically assumed that the extent of their retained rights
was determined by positive law. For the framers and ratifiers, as for
most late eighteenth century Americans, an analysis based on natural
rights was not incompatible with a form of positivism.
How did Americans reconcile natural rights and positive law?
Americans regularly theorized that individuals in the state of nature
were equally free-that they had no common superior and so were
free from subjugation to one another. This undifferentiated freedom
was an individual's "natural liberty," any portion of which was a
"natural right." Put more crudely, a natural right was part of the
freedom an individual had in the absence of government. Such
freedom, however, was precarious, for it was subject to the depredations of others. To preserve their natural liberty, therefore, individuals gave up as much of their natural liberty as was necessary to
establish government. Americans rarely seemed to tire of telling each
other that individuals preserved their natural freedom by submitting
some of it to government and civil laws; they iterated this political
truth so often that it became "a hackneyed and well-known principle. " 4 Of course, when forming government to protect their natural
liberty, the people also had to protect themselves from the government they were creating. For this purpose, they had to settle in their
"contract of government," "fundamental law" or "constitution"
precisely what natural liberty was sacrificed to government and what
was retained. Thus, according to the natural-rights theory, the people
stipulated in their constitutions the natural rights they gave up to
government and the natural rights they would keep. 5 The naturalrights theory justified and explained what we would consider a
"positivist" conception of constitutions. 6

3. Speaking of the phrase "retained rights" as used in the context of the natural-rights
theory, Professor McAffee says that "there is no such term of art associated with the reference
to rights retained by the people." Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract
Theory And Rights "Retained By The People" 18-19 (September 13, 1991) (unpublished
manuscript on file with Southern Illinois University Law Journal).
4. LETTER FROM WILLIAM PIERCE TO ST. GEORGE TUCKER (March 20, 1788), reprinted in
16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 443 (John P. Kaminski
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986). Pierce said that individuals "give up a part of their natural
rights to secure the rest."
5. Constitutions also stipulated various acquired rights-that is, rights not existing in the
state of nature.
6. For more on this see Walter Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of
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This natural-rights analysis can be observed in both Federalist
and Anti-Federalist arguments about a federal bill of rights. AntiFederalists insisted upon enumeration of the natural rights to be
retained. As one Anti-Federalist said, "[t]o define what portion of
his natural liberty, the subject shall at all times be entitled to retain,
is one great end of a bill of rights. m Federalists, however, preferred
to identify the retained rights largely by means of an enumeration
of powers. One Federalist explained:
It is well known that several of the states on the continent have
never made any formal declaration of their rights. Well aware of
the impossibility of enumerating all those blessings to which by
nature they were entitled, and highly sensible of the danger there
was intrusting to their recollection of them (knowing that when
once they attempted to set to them legal bounds, what ever should
by chance be left out, was of course given up) some of the states
more prudently thought fit to enumerate on the other hand what
should be the powers of their government, when of course what
ever was omitted on that side, remained as their natural and
inviolable rights on the other. And but few states in the world have
deemed it safe to do otherside. 8
A constitution that enumerated powers rather than rights, said Federalists, would leave to the people, not merely the natural rights
listed, but innumerable natural rights.
Thus, when late eighteenth century Americans-Federalist or
Anti-Federalist-said that they "retained" various natural rights, they
were indicating that they had a government of limited authoritythat the absence of government power left the people in other respects
free. They were assuming, moreover, that the Constitution defined
what liberty was retained. Consequently, the rights retained by the
people consisted of the absence of federal authority; these rights
Nature, 3 SuP. CT. REV. 49 (1982). Obviously, in some senses, late eighteenth century Americans
were not positivists. For example, they frequently condemned constitutions that failed adequately to protect natural liberty, including "inalienable" natural rights. Yet they typically
assumed that they could remedy such failures only by amending the Constitution or, more
generally, adopting a new one-if necessary, by means of revolution. See id. & Helen Michaels,

The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate
Judicial Enforcement of "Unwritten" Individual Rights?" 69 N.C. L. REV. 421 (1991). The
natural rights unprotected by a constitution or other civil law were mere "imperfect" rights.
For another perspective, see the other comments on Professor McAffee's paper. As this
paper is not a comment on those comments, I will simply indicate my disagreement.
7. AN OLD WHIG IV (Oct. 27, 1787), reprinted in 13 THE DocuMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 497, 501 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds., 1981).
8. STATE SOLDIER II (Feb. 6, 1788), reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFJCATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 352 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988).
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consisted not only of the rights specified in the Constitution but also
of the undifferentiated liberty defined by the specified federal powers.
In this sense, the rights retained by the people were innumerable and
judicially enforceable.
The assumption that the rights retained by the people were
defined not merely by the list of rights but also by the list of powers
can be illustrated by the restrictions on federal power with respect
to the press. Although, during the ratification debates, Federalists
frequently assured Americans that the federal government would
have no power to regulate the press, Anti-Federalists pointed out
that Congress would be able to restrain the press under the tax
provision and the necessary-and-proper clause. 9 For this reason,
among others, Anti-Federalists demanded enumeration of the freedom of the press; enumeration of the right, they said, would forbid
the federal government from doing some things it was permitted to
do by the enumeration of powers. 10 Yet the First Amendment did
not render the absence of a press power unimportant. On the
contrary, the absence of an enumerated federal power to regulate
the press precluded the federal government from taking some actions
against the press that were allowed by a free-press clause. For
example, Federalists assumed that Article One, far from merely
prohibiting Congress from abridging the "freedom of tlie press,"
more generally did not even authorize Congress to regulate the press. 11

9. They also sometimes mentioned the language about general welfare.
10. LETTERS FROM A FEDERAL FARMER (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 250 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); T!MOLEON (Nov. I, 1787), reprinted in 13 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 535 (John P. Kaminski
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981).
11. James Wilson said: "If ... a power similar to that which has been granted for the
regulation of commerce, had been granted to regulate literary publications, it would have been
as necessary to stipulate that the liberty of the press should be preserved inviolate, as that the
impost should be general in its operation." JAMES WILSON, SPEECH IN STATE HOUSE YARD
(Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 168 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). In other words, in the course of arguing that it
was unnecessary to stipulate the right of freedom of the press, Wilson pointed out that the
absence of an enumerated power regarding the press had a broader effect. Obviously, there
was truth on both sides: The enumerated right and the absence of an enumerated power each
protected the press from the federal government in ways the other did not.
Wilson also said that "the proposed system possesses no influence whatever upon the
press, and it would have been merely nugatory to have introduced a formal declaration upon
the subject-nay, that very declaration might have been construed to imply that some degree
of power was given, since we undertook to define its extent." Id. Hence, the need for the
Ninth Amendment.
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Later, when George Hay, Tunis Wortman, and other Americans
responded to the Alien and Sedition Acts with broad claims on behalf
of the press, they argued not only on the basis of the First Amendment but also-indeed, sometimes with greater emphasis-on the
ground that the federal government was a government of enumerated
powers. 12 The enumeration of powers was essential to the definition
of retained rights, including retained press rights. 13
Of course, the rights retained were understood in the context of
a federal system. Just because the United States Constitution left
many natural rights unimpaired by federal power did not mean that
state constitutions left the same natural rights untouched by state
power . 14 Indeed, it was one of the fundamental assumptions of the
framers and ratifiers that states in the exercise of their police power
would restrain natural rights differently and, in many respects, more
extensively than the federal government. For example, the United
States Constitution, as jut seen, greatly limited the federal government's ability to restrict the press, but it did not thereby preclude
state restraints on the press. The framers and ratifiers of the United
States Constitution and Bill of Rights assumed the existence of state
constitutions and laws, which placed their own restraints on natural
liberty.
This point may be illustrated by a document of the Committee
of Detail in 1787. In sketching a draft of the United States Constitution, the document argued against a preamble that would "designat[e] the ends of government and human polities":
This display of theory, howsoever proper in the first formation of
state governments, is unfit here; since we are not working on the
natural rights of men not yet gathered into society, but upon those
rights, modified by society, and interwoven with what we call the
rights of states. u

12. HoRTENTIUS [i.e., George Hay], AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 5-32 (1799));
TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING PoLmCAL ENQUIRY AND THE LIBERTY OF THE
PRESS 207-32 (1800). See also KENTUCKY REsOLUTION (Nov. 10, 1798), reprinted in l DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEOAL HISTORY 160 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1989).
13. Obviously, this suggests interesting issues relating to the Fourteenth Amendment's
"incorporation" of the Bill of Rights.
14. For an important examination of this theme, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Original
Purposes of the Bill of Rights: James Madison and the Founders' Search for a Workable
Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1261 (1989).
15. SUPPLEMENT To MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
183 (J.H. Hutson ed., 1987) (in the handwriting of Randolph and Rutlege).

312

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 16

In other words, natural rights had to be analyzed in the context of
the federal system. Although the people, by adopting the United
States Constitution, gave up some of their natural rights to the
federal government, they had already, in their state constitutions,
made various concessions of natural rights to state governments.
In sum, natural rights were portions of the freedom individuals
had in the state of nature, and, by adopting a constitution, the
people gave up some of these rights to government. As a result, late
eighteenth century Americans were not abandoning a "positivist"
understanding of the rights retained when they said that those rights
included natural rights. The rights the people retained under a
constitution, including the natural rights they retained, were the rights
they reserved to themselves by means of the constitution.

